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Rungs on the Labour Law Ladder:
Using Gender to Challenge Hierarchy
Judy Fudge*
This paper identifies the limitations that inhere in the conventional
Canadian approach of using labour law to challenge women's subordination
within the labour market. To do so, it draws upon my previous writing on the
legal regulation of women's employment. My overarching research concern
is to understand labour law's relationship to labour market inequality. I have
used women workers as a focal point because historically they have been, and
continue to be, located at the bottom of the labour market. 1 While ascribed
characteristics other than sex, such as race, ability, and aboriginal status
influence a worker's position in the labour market, it is women with these
characteristics who are situated at the bottom. 2 Nonetheless, it is important
Osgoode Hall Law School. The research on which this paper is based could not have been
conducted but for the assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council,
Grant #410-93-1169. 1 want to thank the College of Law at the University of Saskatchewan
for inviting me to speak to them on the topic of women and labour law, and Harry Glasbeek,
Leah Vosko, and the anonymous reviewers of the Saskatchewan Law Review for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft. I am, however, responsible for all errors and shortcomings in
this paper.
1 This paper draws upon my previous work in this area: "Gender Issues in Arbitration: An
Academic Perspective" in W. Kaplan, J. Sack & M. Gunderson, eds., Labour Arbitration Yearbook
1991, vol. 1 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) 119; Labour Law's Little Sister: The Employment
Standards Act and the Feminization of Labour (Ottawa: Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives,
1991); with P. McDermott, eds., Just Wages: A Feminist Assessment of Pay Equity (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1991); "The Gendered Dimension of Labour Law: Why Women
Need Inclusive Unionism and Broader-based Bargaining" in L. Briskin & P. McDermott, eds.,
Women Challenging Unions: Feminism, Democracy, and Militancy (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1993) 231; with E. Tucker, "Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: Legal
Issues of Regulation, Enforcement, and Redress" in Legal and Ethical Issues in New Reproductive
Technologies: Pregnancy and Parenthood, vol. 4, Research Studies of the Royal Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1993) 161;
"Fragmentation and Feminization: The Challenge of Equity for Labour-Relations Policy" in J.
Brodie, ed., Women and Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996) 57; with H.
Glasbeek, "The Legacy of PC 1003" (1995) 3 Can. Lab. & Emp. LJ. 357.
2 See the studies and findings discussed in T.D. Gupta, Racism and Paid Work (Toronto:
Garamond, 1996) at 7-8; P.J. Poole & J. Rebick, "Not Another Hundred Years: The Failure of
the Federal Employment Equity Act" (1993) 1 Can. Lab. LJ. 341.
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to recognize that although all women tend to experience systemic disadvantages
in the labour market as compared to men, sex discrimination may be
compounded by other forms of systemic discrimination with the result that
not all women are treated the same. 3 By focusing on how labour law treats
women workers, I do not mean to suggest that only women workers have
valid claims for improvements in their terms and conditions of employment.
Far from it. If my analysis of labour law's treatment of women employees has
any value, it may have implications for understanding and evaluating the
law's response to other forms of systemic discrimination in employment. My
general argument is that, rather than challenging employment inequality,
labour law reproduces and reinforces it. Moreover, this is becoming
increasingly evident in the current economic context. 4
At the outset, I shall define some of the terms I will be using in this
discussion. The first is "labour law". Since I am concerned with understanding
how regulation ameliorates, mediates, and reinforces labour market
inequality, a broad definition of labour law is adopted. I use "labour" to
denote a specific subject area of regulation and "law" to encompass a variety
of different legal forms. Labour law refers to the regulation of terms and
conditions of employment. Such regulation may be direct, in that it imposes
One of the problems with addressing systemic discrimination in the workplace and the labour
market is that Canadian human rights legislation generally iterates a number of discrete,
prohibited grounds of discrimination into which the complainant must place herself or
himself. This causes real difficulties for complainants who allege multiple grounds of
discrimination and it results in an additive approach to discrimination at best, or to
ignoring certain forms of discrimination at worst. According to Nitya Duclos, "The most
fundamental error in current antidiscrimination doctrine [under human rights legislation]
lies in its location of difference in the individual complainant rather than in his or her
relationship with others. It treats difference as an intrinsic characteristic of the individual-
the discrimination is due to his or her race or sex-rather than as arising out of the relationship
between that individual and others." Duclos, "Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women
in Human Rights Cases" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 25 at 47 [footnote omitted, emphasis in the original].
4 It is well-established that the process of economic and political restructuring, which invokes
the inevitability of global competition to justify a shift of power from the democratically
accountable public sphere to the private realm of market relations and the narrow calculus of
economic self-interest, has resulted in a deterioration in the working conditions and wages of
the majority of Canadian workers. See, for example, P. Armstrong, "The Feminization of the
Labour Force: Harmonizing Down in a Global Economy" in I. Bakker, ed., Rethinking
Restructuring Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 29; D.
Broad, "Globalization and the Casual Labour Problem: History and Prospects" (1995) 22 Social
Justice; D. Broad, "Global Economic Restructuring and the (Re)Casualization of Labour in the
Centre: with Canadian Illustrations" (1991) 14 Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 555. There is
also a growing body of Canadian literature that examines the gendered nature of the
restructuring process. See 1. Bakker, ed., The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy
(London: Zed Books, 1994); J. Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian
Women's Movement (Halifax: Fernwood Press, 1995); 1. Bakker, ed., Rethinking Restructuring:
Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
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minimum terms and conditions or prohibits terms and conditions that are
discriminatory, or indirect, by providing access to collective bargaining.
Moreover, law not only refers to legislation, but also includes both the
interpretation and application of such legislation by administrators, statutory
adjudicators, grievance arbitrators, and the courts. While in theory it is possible
to distinguish legislation, administration, and jurisprudence, in practice
these different legal forms operate together to regulate employment within
the Canadian labour market.
The next two terms that need to be defined are "sex" and "gender". Sex
refers to the biological differences between men and women. Gender, in
contrast, refers to the social significance attributed to sexual difference. Later
in the paper, I argue that it is important to distinguish between these terms,
rather than use them interchangeably. Gender is employed as an analytical
concept to understand social relations, while sex is used as a descriptive
category that refers to biological men and women.
This paper is organized into four linked sections. First, I will argue that
labour law's traditional focus on women's distinctive sexual and reproductive
characteristics both obscures how women's subordination is reproduced and
treats men as the standard against which women are judged. Second, I will
illustrate how the traditional approach to conceptualizing women's unequal
labour market position has resulted in a series of legislative strategies that,
although they were designed to ameliorate some of the worst abuses experienced
by women employees, have done little to challenge the underlying inequality
of the labour market. By focusing on women workers' distinctive attributes,
legislation has either been designed to respond to women's different needs or
to neutralize these differences. This sameness/difference framework is not
sufficiently attentive to the dynamic structure of inequality that permeates
the employment relationship. Third, I will indicate why gender is a more
useful analytic concept than sex, which is purely descriptive, for understanding
women's labour market position. Fourth, I will argue that labour law, which
includes collective bargaining, employment standards, human rights, and
other equity laws and their interpretation and application, is gendered and
that it reinforces the hierarchical structure of the labour market in Canada.
Labour law is organized as a ladder, with those at the top of the labour market
enjoying certain legislative regimes, while those at the bottom are forced to
rely on other less adequate forms of regulation. Where a worker is situated in
the labour market will largely determine what kinds of remedies labour law
can offer. I will conclude by briefly suggesting the ways in which labour law
can be reconceived to challenge inequality in an increasingly polarized
labour market.
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH FOCUSING ON WOMEN'S SEX
If you look at any standard casebook or textbook on Canadian labour law,
the starting assumption appears to be a sexless worker.5 But, upon closer
examination, sex is irrelevant only so long as there is an all male cast. Men's
sex is invisible because it as regarded as the norm, and hence unproblematic.
Sex becomes an issue when the worker is a woman. One effect of this starting
assumption is that women workers figure in labour law in a peculiar sort of
way-a way that is intimately tied to their sexual characteristics. The standard
worker remains sexless until specific problems, seen as exclusively those of
women workers, arise. But because labour law responds to what are
conceptualized as problems relating exclusively to women's sexual
characteristics, the definition of a standard worker, a male, is not challenged.
Indeed, it is reinforced. 6
In a standard labour casebook or textbook, women figure under certain
headings such as reproductive hazards, maternity leave and benefits, equal
pay for equal work, affirmative action, and sexual harassment. Labour law
responds to the problems that arise from women's sex at work in two general
ways. On the one hand, women are given special treatment or protection
because of their unique reproductive capacities. On the other hand, women
are treated the same as men to counteract sex discrimination in employment.
Two examples can be used to illustrate this contradiction. The first is
how labour law responds to the problem posed by women's reproductive
5 See, for example, the leading labour law casebook in Canada: Labour Law Casebook Group,
Labour Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 5th ed. (Kingston: Industrial Relations Press,
Queen's University, 1991). Here, a mea culpa is in order. As a member of the Casebook Group
for the fifth edition, I attempted to insert gender into the conceptual framework of the
materials, albeit implicitly, in order to illuminate the fact that the standard worker is assumed
to be male (see the Introduction and Chapter twelve on Employment Standards Legislation).
This limited attempt was not successful. In fact, because the conceptual framework was not
explicit, the technique I adopted tended to reinforce the assumption that the standard worker
is male. In the casebook, sex segregation in the labour market is identified as a problem in
employment only to the extent that women workers are explicitly being discussed. It is not
treated as a defining feature of the labour market. One of the implications of the argument
presented in this paper is that an analysis of labour law that is attentive to gender would lead
to a wholesale revision of the pedagogic treatment of labour law. For leading labour law texts
in which the position of women in the labour market is rarely mentioned, see G.W. Adams,
Canadian Labour Law, 2d ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1995) and H.W. Arthurs et al., Labour
Law and Industrial Relations In Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1993).
Although there are no similar articles in Canada, in both England and Australia some
preliminary attempts have been made to disclose the gendered nature of the traditional
approach to labour law. See J. Conaghan, "The Invisibility of Women in Labour Law: Gender-
neutrality in Model-building" (1986) 14 Int'l. J. Soc. L. 337 and R. Hunter, "Representing
Gender in Legal Analysis" (1991) 18 Melbourne Univ. L.R. 505.
6 One of the reasons for using the concept of gender rather than sex is that it reveals how the
norm of labour law is male-biased.
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capacity to bear children. 7 Early health and safety legislation in Canada
singled out women and children for special protection. Such legislation
focused on the possible adverse effects of work on women's health, offspring,
mortality, and morality. Women were protected primarily as mothers, not as
workers.8 However, as Veronica Strong-Boag points out, "most such legislation
acknowledged female inferiority much more than it aimed at its elimination." 9
Gillian Creese also points out that "[p]rotective legislation was premised on
women's subordinate positions within the family, the economy and civil
society."] 0 Moreover, legislative protection of women operated in the context
of employers who had, for a long time, excluded women from predominantly
male jobs on the basis of biological differences. Such exclusion was initially
justified on the ground that women's anatomy, and specifically their
reproductive capacity, was vulnerable to injury. Legislation that began to
remove women's employment barriers was introduced in the 1950s, although
the progress of legislative equality was uneven. 11
While restrictive legislation is generally a thing of the past in Canada,
the theme of protection for women workers has not disappeared. In its place,
7 The discussion of reproductive hazards is drawn from Fudge & Tucker, "Reproductive Hazards
in the Workplace" supra note 1. See S.J. Kenney, For Whose Protection? Reproductive Hazards and
Exclusionary Policies in the United States and Britain (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1992) for a discussion of the legal regulation of reproductive hazards in the workplace in other
jurisdictions.
8 E. Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of Occupational Health and
Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 82-96;
N.M. Chbnier, Reproductive Hazards at Work: Men, Women and the Fertility Gamble (Ottawa:
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1982) at 39. It is interesting to note that
although the political impetus behind the first factory legislation in Ontario was to protect
women and children from the ravages of industrial capitalism, women's organizations were
not involved in the campaign, although the legislation had broad support. In Ontario during
the early 1880s, women's organizations such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union
did not actively pursue the issue of women's occupational health and safety. It was not until
the next decade that women's paid work became a prominent issue on the agenda of middle-
class women's reform organizations. While the endorsement of protective legislation for
women workers was not universal within the women's reform community, it was dominant.
The majority of women reformers and their organizations embraced the prevailing ideology
that women's proper place was in the home and not in the workplace. In her study of pro-
tective legislation for women workers in the 1880s and 1890s, Constance Backhouse con-
cludes that "it focused on women primarily as sexual objects and only secondarily as work-
ers." Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth-Century Canada
(Toronto: Women's Press, 1991) at 292.
9 V. Strong-Boag, "The Girl of the New Day: Canadian Working Women in the 1920s" (1979) 4
Labour/Le Travailleur 131 at 158.
10 G. Creese, "Sexual Equality and the Minimum Wage in British Columbia" (1991) 26 J. Can.
Studies 120 at 122.
11 J. Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family (Toronto:
Women's Press, 1992) at 246.
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a new form of protectionism has surfaced, whereby individual industries and
employers have expressed concern for women's reproductive capacity and
the health and safety of fetuses; however, instead of preventing or minimizing
the risk to women and fetuses by excluding the hazard, the typical corporate
and, on occasion, public regulatory response has been to exclude fertile
women. 12
These sex-specific policies have raised a number of problems to which
labour law has had to respond. At the most general level, the challenge posed
to labour law is one of balancing occupational health and safety concerns for
pregnant women and their fetuses against the rights of women of child-
bearing age to equal treatment and opportunity in employment. The balance
that labour law seeks to strike is subject to competing tugs and pulls. At the
same time as some women are using human rights legislation to challenge
policies that exclude them from certain activities because of the apprehended
danger to fetuses, 13 other women are deploying occupational health and
safety legislation to bolster their rights to refuse to work in situations that are
potentially dangerous to their own health or the health of their fetuses. 14 The
dilemma that labour law faces is balancing equality for women and men in
employment against concerns for the reproductive health of women
employees.
Where labour law draws the line between safety and human rights
depends upon the scope of the exclusion or protection policy, the evidence
of potential harm, and the options available to the employer both to protect
the fetus and to operate its business in a profitable or productive manner.15
What labour law rarely questions are two basic assumptions: 1) that the
conflict between safety and equality is identified as one that is embodied in
the competing aspirations of women workers to be employed in jobs that pay
decent wages while simultaneously bearing healthy children; and 2) that
women are exclusively involved in reproduction. I shall to refer to these
assumptions as the myth of the disappearing employer and the myth of
immaculate conception respectively.
In the first myth, the employer's responsibility for creating the hazard
through his or her control over the labour process disappears; instead, the
employer's role is refashioned as that of the protector of the fetus from the
employment choices of the woman worker. Fetuses are regarded as hyper-
12 Fudge & Tucker, "Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace", supra note 1 at 162.
13 Ibid. at 266-70.
14 Ibid. at 179-81; Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, Part III, Division VII.
15 Fudge & Tucker, ibid. at 266-70 and 271-77.
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susceptible to harm from substances that are often found in workplaces. In
justifying protective policies for fetuses, employers point to their general
concern for the health of the next generation and their desire to avoid
potential liability for fetal damage. Unlike workers, the vast majority of
whom are covered by workers' compensation legislation, children who are
harmed by prenatal exposure to workplace hazards can bring civil actions. 16
The emphasis is on the individual woman's employment choice that poses a
threat to fetal health, rather than on the employer's production decisions
that give rise to hazards and create conflicts between fetal health and
women's employment rights in the first place.
Joined with the concern about fetal vulnerability is the belief that hazards
are transmitted primarily through the woman's body. According to the myth
of immaculate conception, men's contribution to conception is ignored,
despite accumulated evidence that men workers are subject to occupational
hazards that detrimentally impact on their reproductive choices and may
influence fetal health and viability. 17
These assumptions, or myths, lead to a number of pernicious consequences.
First, employers' prerogatives over production decisions, how to organize
work, and what processes to use are not challenged unless they are proven to
be unsafe for their workers. There is little pre-screening of the health and
safety consequences of production decisions, with the result that workers are
turned into guinea pigs. Despite the existence of occupational health and
safety legislation that provides workers with the right to participate on
joint employer/employee health and safety committees, these rights of
participation have done little to shift the balance of power when it comes to
the employer's ability to implement production decisions that may have
detrimental consequences on the health of the workforce. 18 Once potential
hazards are identified, the typical response is to develop ameliorative
mechanisms to deal with the problem, such as excluding women of
childbearing age rather than dealing with the hazard at the source. Second,
because the focus is on reproductive hazards to women, when women perform
what has conventionally been characterized as men's work, there is little
16 Ibid. at 251-54.
17 Ibid. at 258, 270, and 285.
18 Collective bargaining plays a large role in influencing the effectiveness of occupational health
and safety legislation. See R. Brown, "Unions, Markets and Other Regulatory Mechanisms:
Theory and Evidence" (1994) 44 U.T.LJ. 38. For a critical assessment of the most recent wave
of occupational health and safety reform see E. Tucker, "And Defeat Goes On: An Assessment
of Third Wave Health and Safety Regulation" in F. Pearce & L. Snider, eds., Corporate Crime:
Contemporary Debates (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 245.
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attention paid to reproductive hazards that occur in female-dominated
workplaces. Exclusionary policies for women of childbearing age are
predominate in heavy manufacturing and resource extraction industries
that are dominated by men, not in hospitals, office buildings, or in the service
sector where women are typically employed.1 9 Third, the reproductive hazards
to which male workers are exposed are, generally, simply ignored. And on the
few occasions when reproductive hazards in the workplace for men have
been acknowledged, the response has been quite different. Rather than
excluding men, the harmful substances were banned. 20 Fourth, women who
seek to protect their own reproductive health and the health of their fetuses
are regarded by employers as increased costs they could otherwise avoid by
hiring men or non-fertile female workers.
By focusing on women's reproductive capacities and ignoring men's,
labour law both jeopardizes women's employment equality and men's
reproductive health. This traditional response also ignores the employer's
responsibility in creating the hazards. If labour law was concerned about
equality between men and women in employment and the total health of all
workers, it would require employers to consider and minimize potential
health and safety hazards before implementing any decisions on how to
organize production and services.
The second example of the contradiction apparent in labour law's
treatment of women's sex at work is how it responds to sexual harassment in
the workplace. Although there is some early case law emanating from
Saskatchewan that characterizes what would now be considered sexual
harassment as a grounds for termination of employment at common law, 21
two decades ago, sexual harassment did not have a name. It was simply a
normal and inevitable activity of men when exposed to contact with female
co-workers. 2 2 But gradually human rights legislation, which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sex, was expanded to make this behaviour
illegitimate. The central problem was defining what sorts of activities
constituted sexual harassment. Unwanted sexual interaction that is made a
condition of hiring, continuing in a job, or getting a promotion at the
workplace was the first form of activity that fell foul of anti-discrimination
19 Fudge & Tucker, "Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace", supra note 1 at 258.
20 Ibid. at 270.
21 Chow v. Paragon Cafe, [1942] 1 W.W.R. 519 (Sask. Q.B.).
22 F. Faraday, "Dealing With Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Promise and Limitations
of Human Rights Discourse" (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 33 at 37. See also C. Backhouse
& L. Cohen, The Secret Oppression: Sexual Harassment of Working Women (Toronto: Macmillan,
1978) c. 3.
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law. Later, the prohibition was expanded beyond this type of quid pro quo
harassment to include continued verbal, physical, or psychological harassment,
otherwise known as hostile-environment harassment. 2 3 Moreover, the
response of human rights legislation and jurisprudence to the problem of
sexual harassment has influenced both the negotiation of terms addressing
this issue in collective agreements and their interpretation by arbitrators.
This has provided unionized workers with a choice of raising complaints of
sexual harassment either before a human rights commission or, via the
grievance process, before an arbitrator.2 4
Although the formal definition of what constitutes sexual harassment
has expanded, two vexatious problems continue to plague this area of labour
law; first, when is harassment sexual? and second, what is the standard of
unacceptable conduct or behaviour? 25 Both human rights adjudicators and
collective agreement arbitrators must, at least implicitly, address these
questions when deciding a complaint involving sexual harassment. In
delineating behaviour that does not constitute sexual harassment, one
arbitrator asserted:
The problems [in the particular workplace] may have resulted in
part from the sexist structure of our society, where men are usually
the bosses and women are the subordinates, even though the
woman in many work relationships may have more intelligence
than her supervisor. This can create problems when his authority
is challenged, as here (although a woman supervisor might well
have reacted in the same way to provocations to authority). But
the male supervisor's responses or anger cannot be immediately
characterized as sexual harassment, nor can the structures of the
workplace be changed through arbitration. 26
By requiring the harassment to be explicitly sexual in nature, human rights
adjudicators and grievance arbitrators ignore the fact that many more men
23 Faraday, ibid.; A.P. Aggarwal, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1992).
24 For a discussion of arbitral jurisprudence on sexual harassment and the influence of human
rights legislation see M. Cornish & S. Lopez, "Changing the Workplace Culture Through
Effective Harassment Remedies" (1995) 3 Can. Lab. & Emp. LJ. 95 at 113-26.
25 Fudge, "Gender Issues in Arbitration", supra note 1; Faraday, supra note 22.
26 Arbitrator Swinton in Re C.U.P.E. and O.P.E.J.U., Local 491 (1982), 4 L.A.C. (3d) 385 at 408.
Contrast this with Re Canada Post Corp. and C.U.PW. (1987), 27 L.A.C. 27 at 43-44, discussed
infra, where a distinction between sexual harassment aimed at an employee's sexuality and
sexual harassment aimed at an employee's gender was drawn but not developed.
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manage and supervise women than vice versa.27 What is conventionally
understood as acceptable behaviour on the part of bosses is in fact masculine
behaviour. That men traditionally have been located on higher rungs of the
occupational ladder than women contributes in part to women's subordination
in the workplace. 28 Simply because such subordination may be expressed as
a mix of arrogance and paternalism rather than explicitly sexual behaviour,
does not mean either that women are being treated with equal respect at
work or that the treatment is not gendered.29 Yet, sexual harassment legislation
cannot deal with these forms of subordination. What human rights legislation
and collective agreements can do, however, is provide recourse for individual
women who have experienced conduct that is explicitly sexual in nature. 3 0
The problem with requiring sexual harassment to be explicitly sexual in
nature is compounded by the requirement that the complained of activity or
behaviour must fall short of the standard of socially acceptable behaviour.
What is socially acceptable behaviour? The assumptions that infuse this
standard are visible in a grievance arbitration case involvirg Canada Post and
the Canadian Union of Postal Workers. 31 In this case, a woman had become
the first permanent female employee at a Canada Post loading dock. When
she complained of primarily verbal sexual harassment, her harasser was fired
and the union subsequently grieved the dismissal. The arbitrator found:
In this essentially male atmosphere, an ethos not unlike that of
the proverbial locker-room appears to have developed. The work
often involves heavy physical labour, and the employees tend to
converse in a correspondingly rough fashion. There is a good deal
of generally insulting comment, more or less good-natured, as
well as stories, jokes and comments of an explicitly sexual nature,
all punctuated by the regular use of obscene and blasphemous
language. The female employee testified that she had been led to
expect this kind of atmosphere, and that she had been told by
27 M. Boyd, M.A. Mulvihill & J. Myles, "Gender, Power and Post-Industrialism" (1991) 28 Can.
Rev. of Soc. and Anth. 407 at 428.
28 J. Acker, "Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations" (1990) 4:2 Gender
& Society 130.
29 For a discussion of how, and the extent to which, paternalistic behaviour is gendered see J.
Lown, "Not So Much a Factory, More a Form of Patriarchy: Gender and Class During
Industrialization" in E. Gamarnikow et al., eds., Gender, Class and Work (London: Heinemann,
1983) 28 at 33-36.
30 See C. Sheppard, "Systemic Inequality and Workplace Culture: Challenging the
Institutionalization of Sexual Harassment" (1995) 3 Can. Lab. & Emp. L.J. 249 for a critique
of the individualized approach of existing remedies for sexual harassment.
31 Re Canada Post Corp., supra note 26.
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fellow employees that if she wanted to work on the dock she
would simply have to put up with it.
32
This statement typifies the uncritical assumption that existing conditions in
the workplace are sex-neutral. 33 It also assumes that standards of behaviour
in male-dominated workplaces are acceptable. It is no wonder that men do
not understand sexual harassment complaints made by women when they
treat each other so badly. The proverbial locker room is simply a shorthand
for what is acceptable behaviour in certain types of male-dominated
workplaces. The fact that heavy labour was involved in the Canada Post case
is irrelevant; rarely does one see evidence of such demeaning shenanigans in
hospitals or day cares where primarily women are employed to perform
demanding physical labour.
Increasingly, the right of individual women to challenge the norms of
offensive behaviour in male-dominated workplaces is being recognized by
human rights adjudicators. Even when the offensive conduct falls within the
standard of socially acceptable behaviour for a particular workplace, a legal
remedy may be available to women who complain about specific conduct if
that behaviour would be considered offensive outside that workplace. But, as
Arjun P. Aggarwal points out, "basically the responsibility lies with the
offended person to express her disapproval of such an environment and
make the perpetrators of such behaviour aware that their conduct is personally
offensive." 34 Thus, the onus is on the woman to express her 'personal view'
of what she finds acceptable rather than on the employer to ensure that the
workplace is a respectful environment to women. Women who have the
courage to initiate such complaints may gradually succeed in raising the
benchmark of socially acceptable behaviour in male-dominated workplaces.
There is some evidence that women's concerns for equality and dignity in the
workplace are gradually infiltrating Canadian human rights jurisprudence. 3 5
But to date, with rare exceptions, adjudicators have been reticent directly to
challenge workplace norms that have been historically acceptable to men.3 6
32 Ibid. at 29.
33 Faraday, supra note 22 at 53; Aggarwal, supra note 23 at 89-96.
34 Aggarwal, ibid. at 94.
35 Ibid. at 94-96.
36 There is some indication that this may be changing. In Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., G.M.,
32 F.3rd 1007 (7th Cir. 1994) Judge Posner did not accept GM's defense that the complainant's
tinsmith co-workers, employed in what had historically been a male-dominated workplace
and occupation, had simply engaged in "shop talk" by directing sexually explicit and profane
language at her. I would like to thank Professor Ken Norman for bringing this case to my
attention.
248 Saskatchewan Law Review 1996 Vol. 60
The allegedly sex-neutral standard of socially acceptable behaviour
simply makes the male workplace culture the standard against which
equality is measured. So long as women are treated no worse than men treat
each other, there is no legal problem nor a legal remedy unless an individual
woman complains. And even then, there is no guarantee that the behaviour
will be considered sexual harassment. What the traditional labour law
response to sexual harassment ignores is that harassment of women workers
may not be explicitly sexual and that no worker, whether male or female,
should be subjected to demeaning behaviour in the workplace. Labour law
does not challenge subordination in the workplace per se, it simply prohibits
invidious forms of subordination on enumerated grounds.
II. THE STAGES OF LABOUR LAW: PROTECTION, EQUAL RIGHTS, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
What these examples illustrate are the perils of protection, on the one hand,
and the limitations of a human rights approach to equality, on the other. All
too often protective legislation that is designed to accommodate women's
reproductive capacities and child-rearing responsibilities stress women's roles
as mothers at the expense of their need to earn an adequate living for themselves,
their children, and other dependents. By contrast, an equal rights' approach
that treats men and women workers in the same way ignores the fact that
most women have to balance domestic duties when undertaking employment.
Feminist scholars have characterized this as the sameness/difference dilemma.
But according to the editors of a recent collection of essays on protective
legislation, this "euphonious phrase belies the hard choices that women
must make when they choose between social policies that emphasize their
differences from men and those that insist that men and women be treated
as alike for workplace purposes. These choices are often blurred." 37
The problem with protective legislation that takes women's sexual
difference as its starting place is that it reinforces the male standard worker,
contributes to women's ghettoization in certain occupations and industries,
increases the costs of employing women, and ignores other bases of inequality
in the workplace that ought to be challenged. 38 These problems not only
inhere in the traditional policies designed to deal with reproductive hazards
in the workplace, they also distort labour law's response to pregnant women
37 U. Wikander, A. Kessler-Harris & J. Lewis, "Introduction" in U. Wikander, A. Kessler-Harris &
J. Lewis, eds., Protecting Women: Labor Legislation in Europe, the United States, and Australia,
1880-1920 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois, 1995) 1 at 2.
38 See generally, ibid.
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who not only want time off work in order to have children and to care for
infants but also want a source of income while doing so. Currently, Canadian
legislation that provides both maternity leave and benefits is designed so that
only higher paid women can take advantage of it.39 The low level of benefits
and the restrictive conditions for eligibility ensure that low paid women, who
often work in part-time and temporary jobs, simply cannot take the time off
to which they are legally entitled because they cannot afford to do so. In fact,
there is a direct correlation between low take-up rates for maternity and
parental benefits and low wages for women workers. Not only does the
design of maternity and parental benefits disadvantage those women workers
who are already at the bottom of the labour market, it also increases the costs
of employing all women. Moreover, protective legislation that focuses on
women's sex does not address the fact that women themselves occupy different
positions in the labour market hierarchy and, as a consequence, have unequal
access to the benefits of legislative protection.
Similarly, the traditional human rights approach to dealing with sex
discrimination does little to address pervasive inequality in the labour
market. This is because it assumes two things: first, discrimination per se is
unimpeachable and in fact it is often valuable; second, only certain forms of
invidious discrimination should be prohibited. Human rights legislation does
not prohibit all forms of discrimination in employment; it only prohibits
discrimination on enumerated grounds such as sex and race, which are
ineluctable characteristics that historically have been associated with
unequal treatment. 40 It is perfectly legal for an employer to pay someone
lower wages if she has fewer qualifications than other employees. 41 However,
it is illegal for an employer to pay a woman less than a man to do a job of
the same, similar, or equal value.
Because men and women are most often employed in different jobs, any
attempt to ensure that women are paid the same for jobs that are equal in
value requires employers to engage in a complex exercise of revaluing men's
and women's work using sex-neutral criteria. This is the thrust of both
proactive pay equity and complaint-based equal pay for work of equal value
39 This is so despite the fact that the maternity leave benefits under the Unemployment Insurance
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1, as rep. by Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23. have been
repeatedly amended so as not to treat pregnant women worse than other benefit recipients
and to provide sex-neutral parental benefits. See P. Evans & N. Pupo, "Parental Leave:
Assessing Women's Interests" (1992) 6 C.J.W.L. 402.
40 See, for example, the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 5; W. Tarnopolsky &
W.F. Pentney, Discrimination and the Law (Scarborough, Ontario: Carswell, 1994) c. 1 and 2.
41 M. Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia (Melbourne:
Oxford University Press of Australia, 1990) at 18-20.
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legislation. 42 However, unequal valuations within either the class of women's
or men's jobs and an overall reduction in men's wages, which is the standard
against which women's pay inequality is to be measured, does not trigger a
legislative remedy. In fact, it is typical for equal pay and pay equity legislation
to exclude factors such as merit, skills shortages, seniority, and collective
bargaining power-factors that historically have resulted in lower pay for
women's work from the scope of the remedial exercise. 43 What this means is
that women who are relatively well-situated within the labour market will do
better under equal pay and pay equity legislation than the majority of
women who are clustered at the bottom. 44 A well-situated woman, for
example, would have professional skills, work full-time, and/or be represented
by a trade union. This human rights' approach simply adopts the male
standard and thus is a benefit to those women whose work is more analogous
to men's. 45 It does not address pervasive inequalities between women workers
(and men workers for that matter) that result in a lower standard of living.
and more constrained life chances.
Labour law has not remained completely ignorant of, nor untouched by,
the limitations of a protective approach, on the one hand, and an equal
rights' approach, on the other. The third generation of legal responses to
women's inequality in the workplace has been affirmative action. 46 Unlike
protection and equal rights, affirmative action has only been grudgingly and
tentatively embraced by both legislatures and adjudicators. Only the federal
jurisdiction and Ontario, for a very short period, have enacted affirmative
action legislation, which is better known in Canada as employment equity.47
The reason for this hesitation is in part because affirmative action strategies
conflict with the liberal ideal that ascriptive characteristics should be ignored
42 See the collection of essays in Fudge & McDermott, Just Wages, supra note 1.
43 See, for example, the Ontario Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7, s. 8.
44 Fudge, "Fragmentation and Feminization", supra note 1 at 73-77.
45 This is the case despite the fact that the Ontario Pay Equity Act, supra note 43 specifically
mandated gender neutral job comparisons to redress systemic wage inequality between men
and women.
46 The Abella Royal Commission Report recommended affirmative action legislation, which it
called employment equity, marking the third stage in labour law's treatment of women
workers: Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, Equality in Employment by Judge R.
Abella (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1984).
47 Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1984-85-86, c. 31 and Employment Equity Act, 1993, S.O. 1993,
c. 35. Paradoxically, at the same time as the federal Employment Equity Act was strengthened
(S.C. 1995, c. 44), the newly elected Ontario Conservative government repealed the
Employment Equity Act (Job Quotas Repeal Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 4). In Action Travail des
Femmes v. C.N.R. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 193 the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the
authority of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal to order a preferential hiring policy as a
remedy for past acts of sex discrimination in employment. However, despite the authority to
do so, rarely do human rights adjudicators impose an affirmative action policy on an
employer.
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in distributing employment-related benefits and burdens unless it can be
shown that an individual has been disadvantaged by her membership in a
group over which she has no control. While it is possible to argue that the
liberal conception of equality includes both a concern for group rights, as
opposed to individual rights, and equality of outcome, instead of equality of
opportunity, this conception is subsidiary rather than dominant within liberal
legal regimes. 48 Since affirmative action is the exception and not the rule for
redressing the legacy of discrimination in employment, it is vulnerable to
attack within a liberal legal paradigm. 49
Because affirmative action policies typically impose burdens upon the
most recent entrants in the competitive labour market, affecting young
white men rather than older white men who have benefitted from past
discriminatory employment policies, the legitimacy of affirmative action is
further undermined.5 0 When an increasingly competitive labour market,
which generates ever fewer good jobs, is added to liberal concerns about
tampering with individual rights, the backlash against employment equity is
inevitable. 5 1 The problem with the affirmative action strategy is that,
although it aims at addressing economic injustice, it leaves intact the structures
that generate disadvantage in the first place. 52 It does not challenge the
pyramidal shape of the labour market but changes the composition of those
who are granted privileged access to the top. Thus, women and other equity
seekers appear to be the recipients of special treatment and undeserved
largesse. 5 3
III. FOCUSING ON GENDER RATHER THAN SEX
By focusing on women's sex, labour law not only obscures the variety of
forms that women's subordination takes, it does little to challenge the
48 For a discussion of the different meanings of equality in Canadian human rights law see K.
Swinton, "Accommodating Equality in the Unionized Workplace" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J.
703 at 706-13.
49 For a vigorous defense of affirmative action from within the liberal paradigm see M. Kinsley,
"The Spoils of Victimhood: The Case Against the Case Against Affirmative Action" The New
Yorker (27 March 1995) 62.
50 Swinton, supra note 48 at 741-42.
51 Fudge, "Fragmentation and Feminization", supra note 1 at 82.
52 N. Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age"
(1995) 212 New Left Review 68 at 85.
53 The backlash against the Ontario Employment Equity Act, supra note 47, was immediate and
vociferous both in the daily press and law journals. The Ontario Conservative Party capitalized
on this backlash as part of its 1995 "Common Sense Revolution" electoral campaign. See, for
example, "Time For a Debate on Employment Equity" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (17
February 1995) A24; "Employment Inequity" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 September 1994)
A20; R. Martin, "Challenging Orthodoxy: A Critical Analysis of Racially-Based Job
Quotas"(1993) 1 Can. Labour LJ. 409.
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hierarchical organization of the labour market that created the inequality in
the first place. It assumes that the sexual division of labour both between and
within reproduction (the household and the family) and production
(employment and the workplace) is normal and unchanging. Labour law
reifies the notion that the family is properly understood as a heterosexual
couple with a male breadwinner and a dependent wife and children and that
this unit has the primary responsibility for sustaining itself. 54 It ignores the
fact that this family/household form is of relatively recent origin (dating
from the mid-nineteenth century in industrialized countries) and that it has
never been universal, but only numerically dominant.55 Households that do
not easily fit within the paradigm, such as gay and lesbian units or single
parents with dependent children, are either forced within it or viewed as
anomalies. 56
Labour law also takes a particular form of capitalist productive relations
for granted. It assumes that employment relations must be organized
hierarchically on the basis of skill differentials. Labour law generally ignores
the extent to which skill is socially constructed as a result of the outcomes of
struggles, both between employers and workers and between different groups
of workers. 57 Feminist scholars have demonstrated the extent to which the
identification of skill is gendered-that women's talents, capacities, and
techniques are ignored while men's are valued-and how the biased recognition
of skills contributes to the creation and legitimation of a sexually divided
labour market.58
These assumptions are deeply embedded in the laws that regulate
employment. Labour law pits women against men and sex against race in the
competition for good, well-paying, and secure jobs. It also ignores the
consequences of the economic restructuring that has accelerated in Canada
54 For a thorough and sophisticated analysis of familial ideology, see S.A.M. Gavigan, "Paradise
Lost, Paradox Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian, and Gay
Engagement to Law" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall LJ. 589.
55 L. Davidoff & C. Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ursel, supra note 11; W. Seccombe, A Millennium
of Family Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe (London: Verso, 1992).
56 Gavigan, supra note 54.
57 M. Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: The Marxist/Feminist Encounter, rev. ed. (London: Verso,
1988) at 165-71; J. Gaskell, "What Counts as Skill? Reflections on Pay Equity" in Fudge &
McDermott, Just Wages, supra note 1, 141.
58 C. Cockburn, Brothers: Male Dominance and Technological Change (London: Pluto Press, 1983);
M. Steedman, "Skill and Gender in the Canadian Clothing Industry, 1890-1940" in C. Heron
& R. Storey, eds., On the Job: Confronting the Labour Process in Canada (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1986) 152; M.E. McCallum, "Separate Spheres: the Organization of
Work in a Confectionary Factory: Ganong Bros., St. Stephen, New Brunswick" (1989) 24
Labour/Le Travail 69.
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since the mid-1980s: the proportion of good jobs has declined as wages and
employment security have been, and continue to be, eroded. Increasing
numbers of people are employed in small firms that tend to pay lower wages
and provide fewer benefits than do larger corporations. Union influence is
declining as a growing proportion of jobs are difficult, if not impossible, to
organize. Despite the fact that women are almost as likely as men to be
working at paid employment, women continue to receive less pay and to be
employed in female job ghettos. Wages are dropping and jobs are becoming
more insecure as part-time, temporary, and precarious employment expands
and the number of full-time and relatively secure jobs contracts. 59 Protective
equal rights and affirmative action legislation fail to address the fact that it is
competition in the labour market that enables employers to lower wages and
to reduce employment security.
Sex is not the source of women's inequality; inequality results from the
division of labour and competition in the labour market. What sex historically
has done is provide a justification for treating women differently, and worse,
than men. Labour law remedies that fasten on sex in order to improve
women's employment opportunities deal with the historical manifestation of
the problem while ignoring its source; viz, that workers must sell their labour
power in a competitive market to subsist and that there is a sexual division
of labour in which women have primary responsibility for domestic work.
Moreover, sex-based remedies reify the conception of women workers as the
sum of their distinctive sexual characteristics while simultaneously reinforcing
the male standard.
For these reasons, it is important to use gender as an analytic concept for
examining labour market inequality rather than the biological referent sex. 60
While it is true that men and women's sexual attributes differ, the concept of
gender focuses attention on the way in which these minor biological differences
are used both to funnel people into reproductive or productive activities and
to allocate places in a competitive labour market. Gender is the social process
by which significance and value is attributed to sexual difference through
symbols, concepts, and institutions. 61 By understanding gender in this way,
59 Armstrong, supra note 4; Fudge, "Fragmentation and Feminization", supra note 1.
60 See, for example, M. Barrett, supra note 57; J. Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988); J. Fudge, "Concepts and Theories: Understanding Women's
Subordination" [unpublished].
61 Joan Scott defines gender as a constituent element of social relations based upon perceived
differences between the sexes: it is expressed symbolically; gains its meaning through
interpretation by normative concepts that figure in religious, educational, scientific, legal,
and political doctrines; is inscribed in, and ascribed by, institutions; and is integrally related
to subjectivity. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis" (1986) 91 Am.
Historical Rev. 1053 at 1066-70.
254 Saskatchewan Law Review 1996 Vol. 60
we can explore how the institutions of labour law reproduce and reinforce a
labour market that is structured on the basis of unequal relations between
men and women workers. What the concept gender does is provide an
explicitly historical, relational, and dynamic understanding of how
inequality in the labour market is configured, refashioned, and challenged.
IV. RUNGS ON THE LABOUR LAW LADDER
If a gendered approach to understanding labour market inequality is adopted,
the focus of inquiry shifts from women's sex to the institutions of labour law.
Most Canadian labour law courses and casebooks focus almost exclusively
upon collective bargaining legislation and unionized workers, despite the
fact that, historically, never more than half of the Canadian workforce
have enjoyed the benefits of collective bargaining. 62 While trade union
representation and collective bargaining are traditionally seen as involving a
legislative balance between individual choice, on the one hand, and collective
association, on the other hand, in practice Canadian collective bargaining
legislation skews the trade union representation in favour of certain kinds of
workers, employed in certain kinds of occupations in specific sectors. 63
Under Canadian collective bargaining law, employees and unions cannot
simply determine the bargaining constituency for the purpose of forcing an
employer to recognize and bargain with the collectivity. In exchange for the
legal obligation that requires employers to recognize unions for the purpose
of collective bargaining, unions gave up whatever ability they had to determine
their formal bargaining structures. Unions are not permitted to exercise
industrial sanctions to force employers to recognize them; instead, labour
relations boards were granted the exclusive authority to certify a union that
represented a group of employees defined by the board as an appropriate
bargaining unit. The bargaining unit defines the constituency of employees
from which a union must obtain majority support in order to be certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent of those employees for collective bargaining
purposes. It also defines the group of employees that can engage in collective
action for the purpose of collective bargaining. The certification process is
62 Labour Law Casebook Group, supra note S. Although this casebook examines the individual
employment regime and direct statutory regulation of terms and conditions of employment,
over three quarters of the book is devoted to collective bargaining law, policy, and
administration.
63 The discussion of collective bargaining law is drawn from Fudge, "The Gendered Dimension
of Labour Law", supra note 1. Marion Crain also examines the gendered structure of wage
labour and the role of collective bargaining legislation in maintaining it. Although many of
our observations are similar, we adopt a different analytic focus and different conceptions of
power: M. Crain, "Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labour"
(1991) 89 Michigan L.R. 1155.
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controlled by the board and requires a union to sign up a majority of
employees in a unit as members. Once the union has received sufficient
support, it can apply to the board for certification. At that time, the board
will inquire as to whether the unit of employees organized by the union is
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining. If the board so finds, the
union is certified and it can then compel the employer to meet with it for the
purpose of concluding a collective agreement. During the period that the
union is seeking to sign up members, employers are prohibited from
engaging in a number of unfair labour practices that, by and large, cover
interference with lawful trade union activity.
The bargaining unit is the basic structural feature in Canadian labour
relations law. Under Canadian collective bargaining law, labour relations
boards have the exclusive authority to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit. Although labour relations legislation provides some guidance as to what
constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit in certain situations such as craft
workers or professional employees, this is the exception rather than the rule.
Labour relations boards across Canada have developed well-established
policies on what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.
In determining what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit, labour
relations boards must balance a range of complex and often competing
considerations. The concept "community of interest" is applied by all boards
to determine the appropriate bargaining unit. This concept covers a number
of factors, including:
(1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings;
in employment benefits, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment; in the kind of work performed;
and in the qualifications, skills, and training of employees;
(2) the frequency of contact or interchange among employees
and the geographic proximity of workplaces;
(3) continuity or integration of production processes;
(4) common supervision and determination of labour relations
policy;
(5) relationship to the administrative organization of the
employer;
(6) history of collective bargaining;
(7) desires of affected parties and employees; and
(8) extent of union organization. 64
64 Adams, supra note 5 at 7-4.
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What is significant about these criteria is the extent to which they reflect the
initial organizational and production decisions of the employer, such as
where to organize production, what to produce, and the kinds of employees
and skills needed in the production process. A cornerstone of bargaining unit
policy as administered by labour relations boards across Canada is that
mandatory collective bargaining should take place primarily on an employer
by employer basis. Multi-employer bargaining units are rare. Moreover, there
is a bias in most boards' policies toward designating appropriate bargaining
units at the level of the workplace. 65
The standard units that have emerged from the boards' consideration of
the concept of community of interest have tended to reflect the sex segregated
nature of the labour market. Historically, women have been (and continue to
be) over-represented in certain industries (retail as opposed to resource
extraction) and certain occupations .(clerical as opposed to heavy production).
Since bargaining units are typically defined at the level of a single employer's
workplace, rather than the enterprise as a whole, and often reflect occupational
distinctions, bargaining unit determination has tended to reflect the sex
segregated nature of the Canadian labour market.
In some jurisdictions, the gender bias that exists in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit has been quite evident. In Ontario, for example,
standard units defined by the board include a standard production unit and
a standard office unit.66 The separation of office employees from production
employees, except where the office employees are located in or next to the
plant, is a well-entrenched policy. Moreover, until very recently, the Ontario
board had a policy of separating part-time student workers from full-time
workers at the request of either the employer or the union. 6 7 Inside and
outside municipal workers will generally be separated into different units by
65 J.C. Anderson, "The Structure of Collective Bargaining" in J.C. Anderson & M. Gunderson,
eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1982) 173; R.J.
Davies, "The Structure of Collective Bargaining in Canada" in W.C. Ridell, ed., Canadian
Labour Relations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 211.
66 J. Sack & C.M. Mitchell, Ontario Labour Relations Board Law and Practice (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1985) at 148-69.
67 When the NDP government of Ontario amended the Labour Relations Act in 1993 (Labour
Relations Amendment Act, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 36.), one of the changes overcame the board's
previous policy of separating part-time workers into their own units. With Bill 7 (now Labour
Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1), the Tory government removed the legislative changes
concerning the determination of bargaining units for part-time workers and returned the
legislation to the pre-1993 status quo. Despite this, in one recent certification decision the
Ontario Labour Relations Board stated that it was not satisfied that assertions about the lack
of community of interest between full-time and part-time employees ought to continue to be
elevated to the level of a labour relations axiom: Caressant Care Nursing Home of Canada Ltd.
v. C.U.P.E. Local 2225.09, [1996] O.L.R.B. Rep. September/October 748.
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the board. Homeworkers have also been excluded from a unit of production
workers employed in a factory in the garment industry. Since the majority of
office, part-time, inside municipal employees, and homeworkers are women,
these standard units have tended to reinforce gender divisions in collective
bargaining.
Boards in other jurisdictions have not adopted the Ontario board's
standard unit policies. In British Columbia, for example, since the 1970s the
board has had a policy favouring the certification of a single integrated
bargaining unit. Thus, it tends not to certify separate units for production
and white collar work or separate units for full-time and part-time workers.
68
Moreover, between 1973 and 1984, the labour relations statute in British
Columbia provided for a form of multi-employer certification whereby
employers within a sector could be organized under one certification. Even
in Ontario, the concept of community of interest is no longer rigidly applied.
There is increased recognition on the part of labour boards that, although
employees may have many different interests, not all of them will conflict.
Combining employees' bargaining power against their employer may be a
common interest that the board should consider when deciding if the proposed
bargaining unit will be able to engage in viable collective bargaining. 69
The problem with this approach to bargaining unit determination is that
in the case of small workplaces, which are increasing, there is no necessary
correlation between a bargaining unit structure that facilitates organization
and one that results in a viable collective bargaining unit; in fact, the opposite
is true. Outside the construction industry, for which most jurisdictions provide
a variety of forms of legislated broader-based bargaining, it is extremely difficult
for small units to obtain a first collective agreement. This is because the
bargaining unit may determine the success of the certification application
and affect the bargaining power of the union and the point of balance it
creates with that of the employer. Unless the sector is highly unionized or the
workers in the unit have a monopoly over necessary skills, small units of
employees simply do not have much bargaining power.
Certification procedures administered by labour relations boards have
historically favoured full-time workers employed in large workplaces within
the manufacturing and infrastructure sectors. 70 Because these workers are
primarily male, men workers have enjoyed the greatest access to collective
68 Adams, supra note 5 at 7-46.
69 Ibid. at 7-5.
70 A. Forrest, "Securing the Male Breadwinner: A Feminist Interpretation of PC 1003" in C. Gonick,
P. Phillips & J. Vorst, eds., Labour Gains, Labour Pains: 50 Years of PC 1003 (Winnipeg:
Fernwood, 1995) 139.
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bargaining and its concomitant benefits. By linking union organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining to the worksite through the certification
procedure, collective bargaining legislation and labour relations boards
ensured that workers in the peripheral labour market, who were mostly
women, would not benefit from unionization. Because women have historically
been employed in different firms and different occupations than men, the
structure of union representation and collective bargaining reflects the
sex-segregated labour market.
This does not mean that women have been explicitly denied access to
collective bargaining. Women's unionization increased in the late 1960s as
the public sector grew and collective bargaining rights were gradually
extended to the public sector.7 1 Moreover, the number of women in unions
grew considerably in the 1980s. 72 Between 1983 and 1991, the number of
women in unions increased by 34 per cent, while in the same period the
number of male union members only increased by four per cent. Between
1983 and 1991, the proportion of employed female paid workers who were
unionized increased from 29 to 31 per cent. In contrast, the unionization rate
of men declined from 40 to 39 per cent during the same period. Despite these
shifts, women employees are less likely than their male counterparts to be
unionized. In 1991, 31 per cent of all women employees were unionized,
while 39 per cent of all male employees were unionized.
These recent changes in the unionization density of men and women
workers is largely attributable to the shift in jobs from the goods to the service
sector. From 1976 to 1992 union density in the goods sector declined from
43 to 38 per cent. This decline is largely accounted for by the drop in
employment and consequent decline of unionization in manufacturing: the
share of paid workers in manufacturing dropped from 22 to 16 per cent and
their unionization rate dropped from 43 to 33 per cent from 1976 to 1992. 7 3
In contrast, the service sector saw major growth both in employment and
unionization during the same period. The fact that women workers are
highly represented in the service sector, especially in public administration,
health, and education, sub-sectors that are densely unionized, has meant
that unionized women workers have been sheltered relative to their male
counterparts who tend to dominate the manufacturing sector.
71 J. White, Sisters and Solidarity: Women and Unions in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational
Publishing, 1993) c. 2.
72 Statistics Canada: Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Women in the Labour Force:
Target Groups Project, 1994 at 58.
73 D. Galarneau, "Unionized Workers" (1996) 8:1 Perspectives on Labour and Income 43 at 44.
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Despite these broad shifts in the Canadian economy and labour market,
workers employed either on a part-time basis or by small firms continue to
be less likely to be unionized than full-time workers employed by large firms.
This has detrimental consequences for the unionization rate of women
employees since many more women than men work part-time or in small
firms (those with under 20 employees). 74 The vast majority of women
working in small firms within the highly competitive secondary or tertiary
sectors are still unable to enjoy the benefits of union representation and
collective bargaining. This is also the case for the vast majority of women
who work at non-standard jobs-that is, jobs that are part-time, temporary,
poorly paid, and insecure. The fact that the majority of women employed in
the peripheral labour market and in non-standard jobs are not represented by
trade unions has little to do with women's choices. Rather, the problem is
existing collective bargaining legislation.75 According to the report of the
Sub-committee of Special Advisors appointed by the British Columbia
Minister of Labour to review the province's labour relations law:
Existing collective bargaining models, designed for large industrial
operations with full-time workforces, have great difficulty operating
in [private business and personal service sectors]. Collective
bargaining is only viable when there are a sufficient number of
employees to justify union organizing and collective bargaining
efforts. It is simply impractical and unacceptably expensive for
unions to organize and negotiate collective agreements for small
groups of workers if their dues cannot begin to cover the costs
involved in developing separate collective agreements for each of
their work sites. 76
Thus, despite the fact that collective bargaining legislation is gender-
neutral on its face, it has historically assumed a standard worker in a standard
employment situation. That standard worker was male, worked full-time, had
a dependent family, and had a relatively secure job in a large private sector
firm. Despite its extension to the public sector, Canadian collective bargaining
legislation simply does not work for employees or workplaces that fall outside
74 White, supra note 71 at 167-72.
75 Ibid. c. 6.
76 Ministry of Labour and Consumer Services, Sub-committee of Special Advisors, A Report to the
Honourable Moe Sihoto, Minister of Labour: Recommendations for Labour Law Reform byJ. Baigent,
V. Ready & T. Roper (British Columbia: Ministry of Labour and Consumer Services, 1992) at 30.
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a narrowly circumscribed norm.7 7 There is a structural bias built into the
legislation that militates against the extension of collective bargaining rights
to workers in bad jobs-the majority of whom are women.
Employment standards legislation, like collective bargaining law,
assumes a particular norm-but in this case the norm is female and subordinate,
rather than male and dominant. 78 Minimum wage legislation was first
directed at women and children. At the end of the World War I, minimum
wages were explicitly designed to provide a woman with a subsistence living
in the event that she was entirely self-supporting and without dependants.
This benchmark excluded women who were not dependent upon men, but
who did support dependants. 79 This stood in direct contrast with the fair
wages resolutions that were designed to improve the wages of the predominantly
male workers employed by firms that received government contracts. In
these jobs, fair wages were considered living wages for male workers who
supported a dependent wife and children. 80 Another disparity that existed
between men and women workers dealt with minimum wage requirements.
When minimum wages were extended to men workers they were higher than
those required to be paid to women workers. 8 1
By the mid-1960s, however, the minimum standards legislation did
apply equally to both men and women. Despite the fact that this legislation
was gender neutral, it maintained its secondary, subordinate, and feminized
character. Currently, every jurisdiction in Canada has comprehensive
employment-standards legislation that provides a range of statutory entitlements.
However, these standards are low, riddled with exemptions, and ineffectively
enforced.82 The prevailing assumption is that collective bargaining legislation
is the primary, and preferred, mechanism for regulating the terms and
conditions of labour and that employment standards legislation is simply an
77 J. O'Grady, "Beyond the Wagner Act, What Then?" in D. Drache, ed., Getting on Track: Social
Democratic Strategies for Ontario (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1992) 153.
78 Fudge, Labour Law's Little Sister, supra note 1.
79 M. McCallum, "Keeping Women in their Place: The Minimum Wage in Canada, 1910-1925"
(1986) 17 Labour/Le Travail 29; M.H. Hobbs, 'Dead Horses' and 'Muffled Voices': Protective
Legislation, Education and the Minimum Wage for Women in Ontario (M.A. Thesis, University of
Toronto, 1985); R. Russell, "A Fair or Minimum Wage? Women Workers, the State, and the
Origins of Wage Regulation in Western Canada" (1991) 28 Labour/Le Travail 59; Creese, supra
note 10.
80 Russell, supra note 79.
81 Creese, supra note 10; Ursel, supra note 11 at 247.
82 Fudge, Labour Law's Little Sister, supra note 1; Employment Standards Work Group, "The Real
Story: An Analysis of the Impact of Bill 49, The Employment Standards Improvement Act, upon
Unorganized Workers" brief submitted to the Ontario Government, 19 August 1996.
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adjunct to that process. Employment standards legislation continues to be
seen as labour law's little sister.
The institutions of labour law are organized as a ladder. They are also
profoundly gendered. Collective bargaining law sits at the top, limiting
competition and providing the best benefits for those workers lucky enough
to be employed in standard jobs either by large private sector employers in
the resource extraction, transportation, and manufacturing sector or in the
public sector. Employment standards legislation sits at the bottom rung, only
blunting the worst excesses of unrestrained labour market competition. Pay
equity rests somewhere in between. The experience of pay equity legislation
in Ontario clearly demonstrates that its benefits are distributed unequally
amongst women workers.8 3 Those women who are fortunate to be unionized
have been able to make some gains. But, for the majority of women who
work in small firms, have non-union jobs, or who perform non-standard
employment, the promise of pay equity has been illusory.
V. EQUALITY IN A POLARIZED LABOUR MARKET
Equality of opportunity for women who have historically been denied access
to good jobs is an important goal. However, a preoccupation with equalizing
employment opportunities at the same time as the labour market is deteriorating
does nothing to resolve the underlying distributional problem.84 Put simply,
the majority of jobs being created today are bad jobs. At best, pay and
employment equity will intensify the polarization of the labour market for
women and other equity-seekers. 85 Women, aboriginals, disabled persons,
and members of visible minorities who are fortunate enough either to be
employed in the public sector or large firms may well benefit from pay and
employment equity. But the extent they will be able to do so depends upon
a range of factors beyond their control; viz, whether they are employed in
precarious jobs, in unionized workplaces, or by large firms. For the majority
of workers who are entering the current labour market, equality of opportunity
simply means the opportunity to work at jobs that are hard to unionize, pay
little, and provide even less in the way of benefits.
Our norms of labour law and the standard worker no longer meet the
reality of a restructured labour market. Women's labour market participation
rate is approaching men's. 86 The conventional understanding that men work
83 A. McColgan, "Legislating Equal Pay? Lessons from Canada" (1993) 22 Indust. L.J. 269; Fudge,
"Fragmentation and Feminization", supra note I at 76.
84 J. Acker, "Class, Gender and the Relations of Distribution" (1988) 13 Signs 473.
85 Fudge, "Fragmentation and Feminization", supra note I at 82.
86 Armstrong, supra note 4; Fudge, "Fragmentation and Feminization", supra note 1.
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for wages that are adequate to support dependent wives and children is
undermined as households increasingly rely on two wage-earners to maintain
the standard of living that they became accustomed to in the 1970s.8 7
Moreover, it is likely that with the growth in non-standard forms of
employment more men will be performing jobs that have historically been
associated with women. 88 Inter-generational labour market inequality is
growing. 89 There are strains increasing on the existing institutional
arrangements for regulating employment and the hegemonic paradigm with
which it is associated. Rather than responding with nostalgia for the past, it
is essential to treat this period of instability as an opportunity to reconceive
labour law policy and trade union strategy.90
In order to curb the competition that is increasingly polarizing the labour
market into good and bad jobs, we need to topple the labourilaw hierarchy.
Collective bargaining should not be the exclusive preserve of workers at the
top of the labour market. Inclusive forms of collective representation that
counteract the fragmentation in the labour market need to be developed.
This requires both legislative change and a reorientation of labour boards'
policies and practices with respect to determining appropriate bargaining
units. As competition in the labour market increases, legislation and
administrative policies that confine collective bargaining to the level of the
individual employer and workplace do not serve the increasing number of
workers, many of whom are adult women workers and young workers of
both sexes who fall outside the norms of Canadian collective bargaining
units. Although there are many details of design and administration still to
87 G. York, "Family Life: Not Enough Money, Too Much Stress" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (3
January 1992) Al, A5. It is clear that the increased labour market participation of women in
families has preserved many families from experiencing a drop in their standard of living.
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family earnings, and a whopping 46 per cent increase from other members: The Economic
Council of Canada, Legacies: 26th Annual Review, 1989 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1989) at 26. Moreover, the younger the family, the more crucial the earnings of the
wife was to the family avoiding poverty: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women,
110 Canadian Statistic on Work & Family (Background Paper) by D.S. Lero & K.L. Johnson,
(Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1994) at 13.
88 A recent Statistics Canada Study concluded that times were tougher for working men in the
1980s than they were during the Great Depression of the 1930s: J. Ferguson, "Pay For Men
Has Dropped, StatsCan Says" Toronto Star (30 March 1994) C3.
89 C. Pal, "Intergenerational Inequity in the Canadian Labour Market" (Paper prepared for the
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be ironed out, a number of broader-based bargaining models have been
suggested. 9 1 As well, inclusive organizational strategies must be developed in
tandem with a reconceived employment standards policy designed to provide
all workers, no matter where they work, with a decent standard of living and
the flexibility to meet the exigencies of life. 92
But the problem of legislative design is secondary; the primary problem
is the lack of political will to regulate the labour market in a way that minimizes
competition and exploitation at the bottom. Employers oppose these forms
of regulation, and Canadian governments have historically resisted legislation
that is designed to limit competition in the labour market. But such reactions
to workers' attempts to curb competition in the labour market are not new
and they have been challenged, sometimes successfully. The question is
whether the labour movement will embrace a political vision that challenges
the subordination and inequality inscribed in the status quo. Central to this
political vision must be a determination to eradicate gendered inequalities in
the home and the workplace. Labour law is simply part of this challenge.
Labour laws that are designed to promote solidarity amongst workers, rather
than to reinforce and replicate existing lines of fragmentation, will help
improve the situation of those workers crowded at the bottom of the labour
market-where women are disproportionately found.
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